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Abstract
Language can be viewed as a set of cues that modulate the comprehender’s thought processes. It is a very subtle
instrument. For example, the literature suggests that people perceive direct speech (e.g., Joanne said: ‘I went out for dinner
last night’) as more vivid and perceptually engaging than indirect speech (e.g., Joanne said that she went out for dinner last
night). But how is this alleged vividness evident in comprehenders’ mental representations? We sought to address this
question in a series of experiments. Our results do not support the idea that, compared to indirect speech, direct speech
enhances the accessibility of information from the communicative or the referential situation during comprehension.
Neither do our results support the idea that the hypothesized more vivid experience of direct speech is caused by a switch
from the visual to the auditory modality. However, our results do show that direct speech leads to a stronger mental
representation of the exact wording of a sentence than does indirect speech. These results show that language has a more
subtle influence on memory representations than was previously suggested.
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Introduction
Suppose you are reading a story that contains the sentence
Joanne said: ‘I went out for dinner last night’. Would it have made a
difference if you had read the very similar Joanne said that she went
out for dinner last night instead? Would it have made a difference, in
other words, if the writer had used indirect speech rather than
direct speech? The fact that the two different forms exist suggests
that they serve different functions in linguistic communication. But
what are these functions?
Indirect speech (e.g., Joanne said that she went out for dinner last night)
is thought to be description-like, whereas direct speech (e.g., Joanne
said: ‘I went out for dinner last night’) is considered to be more
depiction-like [1]. We might construe this to mean that indirect
speech focuses on what is said (the gist of a particular message)
whereas direct speech focuses on creating a mental representation
of the described situation. In terms of the Van Dijk and Kintsch
[2] levels of representation, direct speech focuses on the surface
structure whereas indirect speech focuses on the situation model.
This distinction might be responsible for the fact that people
perceive direct speech as more vivid and perceptually engaging
than indirect speech [3], [4], [5]. Little is known about the effects
of direct and indirect speech on the nature of mental represen-
tations that are formed during reading but research on this topic is
emerging [3], [4], [6].
There is a great deal of evidence that people form mental
representations of the described situation during language
processing (e.g., [2], [7], [8], [9]). These representations are
known as mental models or situation models. Subtly different
linguistic constructions can have different effects on situation
models. For example, various studies have examined the effects of
grammatical aspect (e.g., [10], [11]) and negation [12] on the
construction of situation models. What are the effects of using
direct vs. indirect speech?
Recent studies are supportive of the idea that direct speech is
more engaging than indirect speech. In one study, participants
read short stories containing a direct or an indirect speech
quotation. Context was manipulated so that either a fast or a slow
speaking protagonist was implied. Reading times for direct speech
were influenced by how fast the speaker spoke but reading times
for indirect speech were not [5]. In an attempt to extend this
finding, a recent study [6] explored whether not only speech rate
but also the speed of the character’s movement influences reading
times for direct and indirect speech quotations. People spent less
time reading direct speech quotations when these utterances were
described as being made quickly than as being made slowly. There
was no effect of indirect speech quotations on reading times. There
also was no effect for speed of movement on reading times. It thus
seems that the use of direct speech causes the speaker’s voice to be
more activated in the reader’s mind than the use of indirect
speech. What we do not know is whether this more engaging
experience influences our mental representations of described
situations.
Given that direct speech is apparently perceived as more vivid
than indirect speech, it seems likely that there are (subtle)
differences in the mental representation of a given situation
depending on whether this situation was described in direct or
indirect speech. For example, objects that are present in the
referential situation (i.e., the situation that is talked about) might be
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more accessible when they are talked about in direct speech than
in indirect speech. This hypothesis is consistent with recent
findings [5], [6] that readers are more likely to engage in
perceptual simulations of a situation related in direct speech than
in indirect speech. On the other hand, if, as Clark and Gerrig [1]
suggest, indirect speech is more descriptive than direct speech,
then we might expect situational information to be more strongly
represented in indirect than in direct speech. We investigated this
idea in Experiment 1.
In all of the experiments described in this paper, we used the
same participant-recruitment and participant-exclusion plan,
which is very similar to that of Zwaan and Pecher [13]. Criteria
were set after we conducted the first experiment. For every
experiment, except for Experiment 1a, we recruited 200 partic-
ipants online through Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (http://www.
mturk.com). All experiments were presented online in the
Qualtrics survey research suite (http://www.qualtrics.com). Be-
cause we were interested in running native speakers of English
only, we excluded participants who indicated at the end of the
experiment to be no native speaker of English. We also excluded
data from participants with low accuracy scores (,.75 in
Experiment 2, ,.80 in all other experiments). As these exclusion
procedures often left us with unequal number of participants per
counterbalancing list, we excluded data from the last-run
participants of the longer list to create equal-length lists. After
each experiment we asked participants 1) to guess what the
purpose of the study was, 2) in what kind of environment they
performed the experiment (regarding the amount of distraction
and level of noise; on a 9-point scale), 3) what type of monitor
participants used to perform the task, and 4) some demographical
questions (age, gender, level of education, native language).
For all experiments, response times ,300 ms and .10000 ms
were removed, as they indicate extremely fast or slow responses.
The remaining data were analyzed. Because standard significance
testing might lead to false positives in large samples [14], [15],
[16], we also calculated the posterior probability favoring the
alternative hypothesis using the JZS Bayes Factor (BF01, calculated
with Rouder’s web based application at http://pcl.missouri.edu/
bayesfactor), which provides the odds ratio for the null/alternative
hypotheses given the data. A Bayes Factor of 1 means that they are
equally likely, larger values (.3) indicate more evidence for the
null hypothesis, and smaller values (,.33) indicate more evidence
for the alternative hypothesis. Item analyses for Experiments 1–4
are reported in Appendix S1.
Ethics Statement
The participants in all experiments were recruited online and
voluntarily subscribed for participation in the described experi-
ments. We did not obtain written consent. We did consult with the
Ethics Committee of Psychology (ECP) at the Erasmus University
Rotterdam, the Netherlands and receive a formal written waiver
because the experiment was noninvasive and the results were
analyzed anonymously.
Methods
Experiment 1a
In this first experiment, we investigated the accessibility of
information regarding the referential situation that was either in
direct or indirect speech. We used a probe recognition task to do
so. Probe recognition tasks are commonly used to probe the
strength of situational dimensions such as space [17], time [18],
character goals [19], [20], and combinations thereof [21]. In a
probe-recognition task, words are presented after a sentence. The
participants’ task is to indicate as quickly as possible whether the
word has occurred in the sentence they just read. Responses are
usually very accurate but differences in response speed are thought
to reflect differences in the strength with which situational
information is active in the reader’s working memory [9]. For
example, responses are faster when the probe word refers to an
event that is still ongoing in the described situation than when the
word refers to a past event [18]. Responses are also faster when the
probe word refers to an object that is present in the described
situation than when it refers to an absent object [12].
If direct speech is indeed perceived as more vivid than indirect
speech, one might hypothesize, based on the findings of Yao and
colleagues [3], that information that was presented in direct speech
is more accessible than information presented in indirect speech.
If, on the other hand, indirect speech is perceived as more
descriptive than direct speech, then one might predict the opposite
pattern. Our hypothesis was based on the idea that direct and
indirect speech differ in terms of vividness and therefore we
predicted that people should respond faster to probe words that
were mentioned in direct speech than to probe words that were
mentioned in indirect speech.
Participants. One hundred and eighty participants were
recruited online of which 179 completed the experiment. The
sample had a mean age of 34 (range= 18–75, 108 females). All
participants were residents of the USA and received $1 for their
participation, which required approximately 26 minutes. Ten
participants did report another language than English as their
native language. With the exclusion of these participants, our
sample included 169 native speakers of English.
Materials and procedure. Participants first performed a
lexical decision task in which they were randomly presented with
eight strings of letters (one at a time). They had to indicate as fast
as possible whether a given string was a word (m-key) or not (c-
key). Four words and four non-words were included in this task.
The lexical decision task was added to the actual experiment to
familiarize participants with the task of making speeded responses
to visual stimuli.
Next, participants read 48 short stories (24 experimental, 24
filler; adapted from [3] (see Appendix S2) online, sentence by
sentence. Each story consisted of three sentences with the last
sentence always being a direct or indirect speech quotation (see
example story below). Two versions were created that differed
regarding the last sentence of the experimental stories. Whenever
the last sentence contained a direct speech quotation in one
version, the sentence contained an indirect speech quotation in the
other version. In both versions, half of the quotations were direct.
This was true for both experimental and filler stories. All stories
were presented in a random order.
Example Story (probe)
It was 5.30 p.m. and everybody was ready to leave the office.
At one desk, Elaine was having a quick chat with Steven about
her work.
Direct: She said: ‘‘The amount of paperwork is killing me at the
moment. I feel completely exhausted.’’
Indirect: She said that the amount of paperwork was killing her
at the moment, and that she felt completely exhausted.
Participants performed a probe-recognition task directly after
each story to test the accessibility of text information regarding the
referential situation. Crucially, for the experimental stories the
probe was always a noun that was mentioned in direct or indirect
speech, so each experimental story required a ‘yes’ response. The
probes that followed the filler stories were also nouns but they were
never mentioned previously and thus required a ‘no’ response. All
Direct and Indirect Speech
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probes we used were never mentioned in one of the other stories
(in case of the experimental stories, probes were only mentioned
once). Response times to the probes were measured. To make sure
participants read all stories properly, comprehension questions
followed after 25% of the stories. The right answer to these
questions was ‘yes’ 50% of the time. Three practice trials were
included before the actual experiment started.
Each trial started with the first sentence of a story. Participants
pressed the space bar when they had read a sentence to make the
next sentence appear. Whenever participants pressed the space
bar after the third sentence of the story, a fixation cross appeared
in the middle of the screen for 1000 ms, followed immediately by
the probe. Participants had to indicate as fast as possible whether
this probe was mentioned in the story they just read (m-key) or not
(c-key).
Results. We excluded data from participants with an
accuracy ,80% on the probes (eight participants) and data from
one participant due to problems with the recording of response
times. Finally, we excluded data from six last-run participants on
one of the lists to make both lists equal regarding the number of
participants. Data from the remaining 154 participants were
analyzed. Unfortunately, there was a counterbalancing error
involving one of the stories (it appeared in the same condition
twice), so we excluded this item for all participants.
Mean response times to the probes are displayed in Table 1. In
contrast to what we expected, there was no effect of speech,
t(153) = 1.45, p= .15, BF01=5.55. Accuracy levels were high (.96
for direct and.95 for indirect speech) and did not differ between
conditions, |t| ,1.
Because we did not determine all exclusion criteria before
collecting the data, this study must be considered exploratory in
nature. In Experiment 1b we tried to replicate our findings using
the exact same settings as in Experiment 1a. Therefore, the study
described as Experiment 1b is confirmatory rather than explor-
atory [22]. We followed this procedure for all experiments (see also
[13]).
Experiment 1b
Participants. Given that many psychology studies are
underpowered [23] we started this experiment by conducting a
power analysis with the program G*Power [24] to estimate the
sample size needed to detect an effect of speech on accessibility of
text information regarding the referential situation. According to
this power analysis, at least 174 participants were needed to obtain
statistical power at the recommended.80 level [25] (An anonymous
reviewer suggested to use an ANOVA with repeated measures to
estimate the sample size rather than a t-test. The F-test takes into
account the real correlation between measures (.73, based upon
the results of Experiment 1a) rather than an estimated correlation
(.5). According to this alternative power analysis, at least 154
participants were needed to obtain statistical power at.80 level.
The number of measures per condition was 12. The effect size
was.10 based on the results of Experiment 1a). Because we
anticipated that the sample would include non-native speakers of
English, we recruited 216 participants online of which 209
completed the experiment. The sample had a mean age of 34
(range = 18–70, 117 females). All participants were residents of the
USA and received $1 for their participation, which required
approximately 28 minutes. We excluded the data from six
participants because they reported another language than English
as their native language. With the exclusion of these participants,
our sample included 203 native speakers of English.
Materials and procedure. Except for the fact that we
repaired the counterbalancing error of one of the experimental
stories, the materials and procedure for this experiment were
exactly the same as in Experiment 1a.
Results and Discussion. We excluded data from partici-
pants that had accuracy scores ,.80 (11 participants). Data from
one participant were excluded because he or she also participated
in Experiment 1a and data from seven participants were removed
to equalize both lists regarding the number of participants. Data
from the remaining 184 participants were analyzed.
Mean response times to the probes are displayed in Table 1.
Again, we found no effect of speech, t(183) = 0.09, p= .92,
BF01=17.02. Accuracy levels were somewhat lower than in
Experiment 1a (.95 for direct and.94 for indirect speech) and there
was a significant difference between conditions, t(183) = 2.18,
p= .03, BF01=1.66. So people responded slightly less accurately to
probe words mentioned in indirect than in direct speech.
The results of Experiments 1a and 1b are similar and show
reliable effects. In both studies, text information regarding a
referential situation is not more accessible when this information
was presented in indirect as compared to direct speech. Although
this is not what we expected, Bayesian analyses indicated that the
combined data of both experiments provide strong evidence for
this null effect, BF01=12.79.
Our results do not support our hypothesis that information
regarding the referential situation is more accessible when this
information was mentioned in direct as compared to indirect
speech. But perhaps direct speech does not focus attention on the
referential situation but rather on the communicative situation
itself (i.e., the situation in which a conversation takes place).
Evidence for this idea comes from a recent study by Stites and
colleagues [6]. They found that people tend to read direct speech
quotations faster whenever the talker speaks quickly (i.e., when
someone was in a hurry) compared to when he was talking slowly.
Conversely, they found no effect of talking speed on reading times
on indirect speech quotations. It thus seems that the manner of
speaking is more important in direct than in indirect speech. If this
is true, then information about the manner of speaking should be
more available after direct than after indirect speech. We
investigated this idea in Experiment 2.
Experiment 2a
Participants. Two hundred participants were recruited on-
line of which 188 completed the experiment. The sample had a
mean age of 32 (range = 18–66, 116 females). All participants were
residents of the USA and received $0.75 for their participation,
which required approximately 20 minutes. Eight participants
reported another language than English as their native language.
With the exclusion of these participants, our sample included 180
native speakers of English.
Materials and procedure. Participants first performed a
lexical decision task (see Experiment 1a). Next, they read 48
sentences online (24 experimental sentences that were adapted
from [6]; 24 fillers that we created ourselves; see Appendix S3).
Each sentence consisted of a direct or an indirect speech
quotation. Critically, an adverb was included in all sentences to
provide information about the way of speaking. In the study by
Stites and colleagues [6] only speed of speaking was manipulated.
We decided to also use other kinds of adverbs (e.g., repeatedly,
rudely, respectfully) so that testing the communicative situation
was not limited to talking speed. We created two versions of the
experiment that differed regarding the quotation in the sentence.
Whenever the quotation was in direct speech in one version, it was
in indirect speech in the other version. In both versions, half of the
quotations were direct, whereas the speech quotation was indirect
for the other half of the sentences. This was true for both
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experimental and filler items. All sentences were presented in a
random order.
Participants performed a probe-recognition task directly after
each sentence to test the accessibility of text information regarding
the communicative situation. This time, for the experimental
sentences the probe was always an adverb related to the way of
speaking of the agent. As in our previous experiments, each
experimental sentence required a ‘yes’ response. The probes that
followed the filler stories were also adverbs but were never
mentioned previously and thus required a ‘no’ response. Response
times to the probes were measured. To make sure participants
read all stories properly, comprehension questions followed after
25% of the stories. The right answer to these questions was ‘yes’
50% of the time. Five practice trials were included before the
actual experiment started.
Each trial started with the appearance of a sentence.
Participants pressed the space bar whenever they had read a
sentence to make the next one appear. After the third sentence, a
fixation cross appeared in the middle of the screen for 1000 ms,
followed immediately by the probe. Participants had to indicate as
fast as possible whether this probe was mentioned in the sentence
they had just read (m-key) or not (c-key).
Results. We excluded data from two participants for whom
timing data somehow were not recorded and from participants
Table 1. Critical Dependent Measures from all Experiments.
N Direct M (SD) Indirect M (SD) p Effect size (Cohen’s d) BF01*
Noun
Probe RT* 1a 154 1260 (420) 1225 (386) .15 .09 5.55
Probe RT 1b 184 1357 (526) 1355 (495) .93 .004 17.02
1a and 1b combined 338 12.79
Probe Accuracy 1a 154 .96 (.06) .95 (.07) .80 .15 15.17
Probe Accuracy 1b 184 .95 (.06) .94 (.08) .03 .14 1.66
1a and 1b combined 338 .002
Adverb
Probe RT 2a 168 1209 (467) 1144 (446) .001 .14 .03
Probe RT 2b 176 1210 (446) 1168 (420) .03 .09 1.56
2a and 2b combined 344 .01
Probe Accuracy 2a 168 .93 (.10) .94 (.08) .1 2.11 4.27
Probe Accuracy 2b 176 .91 (.12) .93 (.11) .002 2.17 .16
2a and 2b combined 344 .06
Adverb Additional sentence
Reading times 3a 172 2842 (986) 2916 (983) .069 .08 3
Reading times 3b 174 3129 (1047) 3096 (1082) .401 .03 12
3a and 3b combined 346 14
Probe RT 3a 172 1540 (602) 1537 (622) .922 .00 16
Probe RT 3b 174 1613 (769) 1557 (709) .086 .07 4
3a and 3b combined 346 8
Probe Accuracy 3a 172 .79 (.18) .85 (.15) .000 .36 .00
Probe Accuracy 3b 174 .82 (18) .86 (.15) .000 .32 .01
3a and 3b combined 346 .00
Auditory Probe
Probe RT 4a 140 2607 (870) 2569 (890) .28 .04 8.56
Probe RT 4b 144 3060 (1042) 2997 (1034) .02 .06 1.20
4a and 4b combined 284 1.63
Probe Accuracy 4a 140 .95 (.07) .94 (.07) .54 .14 12.40
Probe Accuracy 4b 144 .92 (.13) .93 (.10) .20 2.09 6.74
4a and 4b combined 284 16.95
Surface structure
d’ *5a 188 1.88 (1.37) 1.55 (1.30) .006 .24 .42
d’* 5b 188 1.90 (1.27) 1.57 (1.25) .002 .26 .15
5a and 5b combined 376 .01
C* 5a 188 0.27 (0.79) 0.29 (0.64) .96 20.03 17.25
C 5b 188 20.21 (0.67) 20.19 (0.66) .56 20.03 14.62
*BF01=Bayes factor; RT = response time in milliseconds; d’=measure of sensitivity, C =measure of tendency to respond ‘yes’.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0065480.t001
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with accuracy scores ,75% (eight participants). The removal of
these ten participants yielded unequal numbers of participants
across lists. Data from the last-run participants of the longest list
were removed so that both list were equal regarding the number of
participants. Our analysis included data from the remaining 168
participants.
Mean response times to the probes are displayed in Table 1. We
found a small but reliable effect. As in Experiments 1a and 1b,
people were faster to respond to probes after reading an indirect
than a direct speech quotation, t(167) = 3.51, p= .0006, BF01= .03.
Accuracy levels were high (.93 for direct and.94 for indirect
speech) and did not differ between conditions, |t|,1.
Experiment 2b
Participants. Two hundred participants were recruited on-
line and all completed the experiment. The sample had a mean
age of 34 (range = 19–69, 115 females). All participants were
residents of the USA and received $0.75 for their participation,
which required approximately 20 minutes. Ten participants did
not report English as their native language. With the exclusion of
these participants, our sample included 190 native speakers of
English.
Materials and procedure. The materials and procedure for
this experiment were exactly the same as in Experiment 2a.
Results and Discussion. We excluded data from partici-
pants that had accuracy scores ,.75 (nine participants). Data from
five participants were removed to equalize both lists with respect to
the number of participants. The remaining data (176 participants)
were analyzed.
Mean response times to the probes are displayed in Table 1. We
found a small effect showing that people respond faster to probes
regarding the communicative situation after indirect than after
direct speech quotations, t(175) = 2.20, p= .03, BF01=1.56.
Bayesian analysis shows that the evidence in favor of the
alternative hypothesis must be considered ambiguous. Accuracy
levels were high (.91 for direct and.93 for indirect speech) and
differed between conditions, t(175) = 3.09, p = .002, BF01= .16.
The results of Experiment 2a show that text information
regarding a communicative situation is more accessible when this
information was presented in indirect as compared to direct
speech. The results of Experiment 2b are ambiguous concerning
the influence of speech on accessibility of information in respect of
the communicative situation. However, Bayesian analysis indicates
that the combined data of both experiments provide strong
evidence for the conclusion that information regarding a
communicative situation is more accessible after indirect than
direct speech, BF01= .01. The alternative hypothesis (faster
responses after indirect than direct speech) is a hundred times
more likely, based on these data, than the null hypothesis.
We expected direct speech to make readers focus more on the
communicative situation (i.e., the way of speaking) as opposed to
the referential situation (i.e., the content of the speech) than
indirect speech. However, our results do not support this
hypothesis. In fact, we found that text information regarding the
communicative situation is more accessible in indirect than in
direct speech.
Experiment 3a
In this experiment we wanted to examine an alternative
explanation for our finding that text information regarding the
communicative situation is more accessible in indirect than in
direct speech. Perhaps direct speech is so engaging that it is more
difficult to switch from the comprehension task to the probe
recognition task after direct than indirect speech. To test this idea,
we added a sentence that did not convey speech to each of our
stimulus texts, such that the probe word was not presented
immediately after the direct/indirect speech manipulation but
after an intervening sentence.
If the probe-response advantage of indirect of over direct speech
persists, then we can rule out that this is due to a larger task-
switching effect in the direct speech condition. Moreover, by
measuring reading times on the added sentence, we could examine
whether switching from direct speech to non-speech incurs
processing costs. If this is not the case, then this would provide
supportive evidence that the probe-response disadvantage for
direct speech found in Experiment 2 is not due to task switching.
Participants. Two hundred participants were recruited on-
line of which 185 completed the experiment. The sample had a
mean age of 34 (range = 18–69, 117 females). All participants were
residents of the USA and received $1 for their participation, which
required approximately 25 minutes. There were seven participants
that did not report English as their native language. With the
exclusion of these participants, our sample included 178 native
speakers of English.
Materials and procedure. In this experiment, we added a
last sentence to the sentences that were used in Experiment 2 after
which the probe appeared. This sentence never contained direct
or indirect speech (see Appendix S3). The procedure was the same
as in Experiment 2, only this time we were also interested in
reading times for all last sentences.
Results. Because removal of the data from nonnative
speakers of English yielded unequal numbers of participants
across lists, we removed the data from six last-run participants of
the longest list. Data from the remaining 172 participants were
analyzed.
Mean reading times for the last sentences and mean response
times to the probes are displayed in Table 1. We found no effect of
speech (direct vs. indirect) on reading times, t(171) = 1.83, p= .069,
BF01=3.18. There was also no effect of speech on response times
to the probes, t(171) = 0.10, p= .92, BF01=16.45. Accuracy levels
were lower than in all previous experiments (.79 for direct and.85
for indirect speech). Importantly, however, we found a significant
difference between conditions regarding accuracy scores,
t(171) = 5.13, p,0.000001, BF01= .00009.
Experiment 3b
Participants. Two hundred participants were recruited on-
line of which 183 completed the experiment. The sample had a
mean age of 33 (range = 18–66, 112 females). All participants were
residents of the USA and received $1 for their participation, which
required approximately 26 minutes. There were four participants
that did not report English as their native language. With the
exclusion of these participants, our sample included 179 native
speakers of English.
Materials and procedure. The materials and procedure for
this experiment were exactly the same as in Experiment 3a.
Results and Discussion. Because removal of the data from
participants who were no native speaker of English yielded
unequal numbers of participants across lists, we removed the data
from five last-run participants of the longest list. Data from the
remaining 174 participants were analyzed.
Mean reading times for the last sentences and mean response
times to the probes are displayed in Table 1. As is Experiment 3a,
we found no effect of speech (direct vs. indirect) on reading times,
t(173) = 0.84, p= .401, BF01=11.71. Also, the analysis regarding
the response times to the probes yielded the same results as in
Experiment 3a. There was no effect of speech on response times,
t(173) = 1.73, p= .086, BF01=3.80. Accuracy levels were compa-
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rable to those in Experiment 3a (.82 for direct and.86 for indirect
speech) and differed again between conditions, t(173) = 3.96,
p= .0001, BF01= .01.
In both experiments we found no effect of speech on reading
times or response times. Moreover, the Bayesian analysis of the
combined data provided very strong evidence for the null
hypothesis regarding reading times (BF01s=14) and response
times to the probes (BF01s=8). If it were more difficult to switch to
a situation with no speech (e.g., the probe recognition task or a
sentence that does not contain any speech) from direct speech than
from indirect speech, one would expect differences in reading
times for the last sentences. Given that we did not find such a
difference, it seems unlikely that the results of Experiments 1 and 2
can be explained by more difficulty in switching to the probe
recognition task after direct than after indirect speech.
Accuracy levels in Experiments 3a and 3b were lower than in
our previous experiments. This finding can be explained by the
fact that participants read another sentence before responding to
the probe. In our previous experiments the probe immediately
followed the sentence in which the probe was mentioned. This
lower accuracy level may also explain why we did not find effects
on probe-response times. There were fewer correct responses that
could be entered into the analysis and participants may have
emphasized accuracy over speed. This is why it is important that
we found significant differences in probe accuracy between
conditions. Participants were more accurate in responding to
probes in the indirect than in the direct speech condition. Bayesian
analysis of the combined data shows that the evidence is very
strong for this conclusion (BF01,.001). This is in line with the
results from Experiment 2, which suggest that indirect speech
favors the communicative situation.
Experiment 4a
So far, we have found no advantage (in terms of the accessibility
of information during language processing) for direct speech over
to indirect speech. It is possible that the ‘more vivid’ experience of
direct speech does not necessarily influence information processing
but prompts a switch from the visual modality (reading) to the
auditory modality. In one recent study [3], participants read some
short stories including a direct or indirect speech quotation while
their brain activity was recorded. Participants showed more brain
activity in the auditory cortex while reading direct as compared to
indirect speech. This is consistent with the idea that silent readers
are more likely to mentally simulate a character’s voice while
reading to direct speech. Thus, if voice areas are more activated
while reading direct as compared to indirect speech, then people
should be primed to respond faster to auditory stimuli after
reading direct speech than indirect speech. This idea is consistent
with the modality switching effect (e.g., [26], [27], [28]). It also
explains why direct-speech responses to visual probes were slower
than expected in our previous experiments; participants had
mentally shifted away from the visual modality.
To test this idea, we presented participants with spoken probe
words rather than written ones (as in Experiments 1–3). Because of
the just-described neuroimaging findings [3], we expected
participants to respond faster to the probe after direct than after
indirect speech because reading direct speech activates the
auditory cortex more strongly than indirect speech.
Participants. Two hundred participants were recruited on-
line of which 193 completed the experiment. The sample had a
mean age of 35 (range = 18–67, 125 females). All participants were
residents of the USA and received $1 for their participation, which
required approximately 28 minutes. There were six participants
that did not report English as their native language. With the
exclusion of these participants, our sample included 187 native
speakers of English.
Materials and procedure. Instead of the lexical decision
task, we had participants perform a categorization task first. They
were auditorily presented with four fruits (grape, lemon, strawberry,
mango) and four animals (horse, tiger, turtle, rabbit; words in Italic
were pronounced by a male). Participants had to decide as fast as
possible whether the word they heard was a fruit (m-key) or an
animal (c-key). Words were presented in random order. We
included this task to familiarize participants with the task of
making speeded responses to auditory stimuli. They were also
instructed to use this task to set the volume of their computer to
the right level.
Next, participants read the same 48 three-sentence stories that
we used in Experiment 1 and performed a probe recognition task.
However, this time, the probes were presented auditorily instead of
visually. The pronounced words were collected from http://www.
merriam-webster.com/. Some stories were slightly changed to
make sure that whenever the probe was pronounced by a male it
was also the case that a male spoke in the story (and not a female).
We did so because we know that people encode features of
speakers’ utterances, like gender [29], and we wanted to prevent
mismatch effects. After each last sentence of a story, a fixation
cross appeared on the screen for 1000 ms. Then participants
heard an auditory probe and indicated as fast as possible whether
the word they heard was present in the story they just read (m-key)
or not (c-key).
To make sure participants read all stories properly, compre-
hension questions followed after 50% of the stories. The right
answer to these questions was ‘yes’ 50% of the time. Three
practice trials were included before the actual experiment started.
Results. We excluded data from participants with an
accuracy ,80% (38 participants). Furthermore, we excluded data
from nine last-run participants on one of the lists to make both lists
equal regarding the number of participants. The remaining data
(140 participants) were analyzed.
Mean response times to the probes are displayed in Table 1.
Although we expected people to respond faster to an auditory
probe after reading direct as compared to indirect speech, we
found no effect of speech on response times to the probes,
t(139) = 1.08, p= .28, BF01=8.56. Accuracy levels were high (.95
for direct and.94 for indirect speech) and did not differ between
conditions, |t|,1.
Experiment 4b
Participants. Two hundred participants were recruited on-
line of which 189 completed the experiment. The sample had a
mean age of 32 (range = 18–65, 116 females). All participants were
residents of the USA and received $1 for their participation, which
required approximately 30 minutes. There were eight participants
that did not report English as their native language. With the
exclusion of these participants, our sample included 181 native
speakers of English.
Materials and procedure. The materials and procedure for
this experiment were exactly the same as in Experiment 4a.
Results and Discussion. We excluded data from partici-
pants with an accuracy ,80% (31 participants) and from six last-
run participants on one of the lists to make both lists equal
regarding the number of participants. The remaining data (144
participants) were analyzed.
Mean response times to the probes are displayed in Table 1. We
found a very small effect. Although we expected people to respond
faster to an auditory probe after reading direct as compared to
indirect speech, we found an effect of speech on response times to
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the probes that was the opposite of this, t(143) = 2.28, p= .02,
BF01=1.2. Accuracy levels were high (.92 and.93) and did not
differ between conditions, |t|,1.
The results of Experiment 4a show that there was no effect of
speech on response times to auditorily presented probes, while the
results of Experiment 4b show a very small effect favoring indirect
speech. We thus ended up with mixed effects. Moreover, Bayesian
analysis of the combined data provides no clear evidence for the
null or the alternative hypothesis regarding response times
(BF01s=1.63).
The results of Experiment 4 do not support the idea that the
more vivid experience of direct speech is caused by a switch from
the visual to the auditory modality. We also tested the idea of
auditory priming by direct speech in four other experiments (two
exploratory and two confirmatory ones). In the first of these
experiments, participants read the same 48 stories that we used in
Experiments 1 and 4. However, after each last sentence,
participants were presented with either a high (650 Hz) or a low
(450 Hz) tone. They were instructed to decide as fast as possible
whether the tone they heard was either high (650 Hz, always
presented after the experimental items) or low (450 Hz, always
presented after fillers). In another study, we replaced the tones by
the spoken words ‘right’ and ‘left’. Participants decided as fast as
possible whether the word they heard was either ‘right’
(experimental items) or ‘left’ (fillers). In none of these experiments
we found an effect of speech on response times.
Our findings do not seem to be consistent with the literature.
However, an experiment by Kurby, Magliano, and Rapp [30] on
auditory imagery experiences (AIEs) during silent reading of direct
speech yielded results similar to ours. In this study, participants
first listened to dialogues between two characters. Then they read
several texts, some of which they heard before, while others were
new. While participants read those texts they performed a probe
recognition task. Probes were auditorily presented and were either
in the voice of the character that originally pronounced that word
(match condition) or in the voice of the other character (mismatch
condition). Participants were faster in the match than in the
mismatch condition but this was only true for familiar scripts. In
other words, people only had AIEs during silent reading of direct
speech when they had previously experienced the same voice in
the same situation. In our experiment, participants had prior
experience with the voices that pronounced the probe words but
not with the particular context in which they appeared. The fact
that we did not find a priming effect of direct speech on auditory
probes is therefore consistent with the results of Kurby and
colleagues [30].
So far, we have found no evidence that direct speech enhances
the availability of information about the referential and commu-
nicative situation relative to indirect speech. If anything, we have
found (some) evidence to the contrary. However, so far we have
only tested mental representations at the level of situation models
(whether these are models of the referential or the communicative
situation). It might be the case that the influence of direct speech
takes place at another level of mental representation. According to
van Dijk and Kintsch’s [2] classic model, linguistic input is
represented at three levels: the surface structure (a representation
of the exact wording of an utterance), the textbase (a represen-
tation of the explicitly stated meaning of an utterance), and the
situation model (a representation of the referential situation). It is
plausible that direct speech influences mental representations at
the level of the surface structure. As we mentioned earlier, direct
speech is thought to focus more on the exact words, whereas the
gist of a particular message is the focus of indirect speech [1]. A
recent study has reported initial evidence for this idea [31].
Participants were presented with a text. Then the text appeared
again and participants were instructed to report any difference
between the two texts. Speech was manipulated (direct vs. indirect)
but also word-change. There could be no change at all between
the two texts, there could be a semantically related word-change
(flatmate – roommate), or a distantly related word-change
(flatmate – brother). Change detection was significantly better in
direct than in indirect speech. The authors therefore conclude that
the exact wording of what was said by a story protagonist is critical
for direct but not for indirect speech.
Based on these results, we expected people to focus more on the
exact words in direct speech than in indirect speech. In
Experiment 5 we tested this idea.
Experiment 5a
Participants. Initially, we recruited 200 participants, but
because of a large number of non-native speakers in two of our
four lists, we decided to run a few more participants in these lists.
In total, 214 participants were recruited online and all completed
the experiment. The sample had a mean age of 34 (range= 15–66,
116 females). All participants were residents of the USA and
received $0.5 for their participation, which required approximate-
ly 18 minutes. There were 15 participants that did not report
English as their native language and one participant reported to be
15 years of age. With the exclusion of these participants, our
sample included 198 adults who were native speakers of English.
Materials and procedure. Participants read all 24 experi-
mental stories, sentence by sentence, that we used in Experiment
1. After each last sentence, a fixation cross appeared on the screen
for 1000 ms. Then a sentence appeared and participants indicated
whether this sentence was exactly the same as one of the sentences
of the story they just read (m-key) or not (c-key). For half of the
stories, the sentence that appeared after the fixation cross was
exactly the same as the last sentence of the story (which was always
a sentence in direct or indirect speech). For the other 12 stories,
the sentence that appeared after the fixation cross was a
paraphrase of the last sentence of the story (see example story
below). We created four lists, so that we could manipulate speech
(direct vs. indirect) and referential sentence (literally vs. para-
phrase) within stories.
Example Story (Paraphrase)
It was 5.30 p.m. and everybody was ready to leave the office.
At one desk, Elaine was having a quick chat with Steven about
her work.
Direct: She said: ‘‘The amount of paperwork is killing me at
the moment. I feel completely/totally exhausted.’’
Indirect: She said that the amount of paperwork was killing
her at the moment, and that she felt completely/totally exhausted.
To make sure participants understood that we were looking for
subtle differences between sentences, we presented them with
three practice trials. They received feedback on their responses
during these trials.
Results. We excluded data from ten last-run participants on
three of our four lists to make all lists equal regarding the number
of participants. Data from the remaining 188 participants were
analyzed.
We computed d’ scores [32]. To be able to use d’, we converted
scores of 1 and 0 to.99 and.01 respectively [33]. ‘Yes’ responses to
literal statements were considered hits, whereas ‘yes’ responses to
paraphrases were counted as false alarms. Mean d’ scores by
condition are displayed in Table 1. The results show a medium
effect of speech on the ability to detect subtle changes in surface
structure even though the textbase and situation model of the
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message remained the same, t(167) = 2.76, p = .006, BF01= .42.
Participants were better at remembering the exact words that were
used in direct than in indirect speech.
This difference cannot be explained by bias. We found no
difference between conditions (direct vs. indirect speech) regarding
the tendency to respond ‘yes’, |t|,1 (see C-scores in Table 1).
Experiment 5b
Participants. Two hundred and one participants were
recruited online (i.e., most likely due to technical issues, we ended
up with data from 51 participants on one of the list) of which 200
completed the experiment. The sample had a mean age of 33
(range = 18–69, 124 females). All participants were residents of the
USA and received $0.5 for their participation, which required
approximately 18 minutes. There were eight participants that did
not report English as their native language. With the exclusion of
these participants, our sample included 192 native speakers of
English.
Materials and procedure. The materials and procedure for
this experiment were exactly the same as in Experiment 5a.
Results and Discussion. We removed data from four last-
run participants to equal all four lists regarding the number of
participants. The remaining data (188 participants) were analyzed.
Again, we computed d’scores (see Table 1) and we found a
significant effect of speech on the ability to detect subtle changes in
texts even though the gist of a message remained the same,
t(187) = 3.14, p= .002, BF01= .15. So, also in this confirmatory
experiment, participants remembered the exact words that were
used better after direct than indirect speech. This effect is due to
differences in sensitivity because we found no differences with
respect to the tendency to respond ‘yes’ between conditions, |t|,1
(see C-scores in Table 1).
Although the effect we found was stronger for Experiment 5b
than for Experiment 5a (due to smaller SDs in the last
experiment), the results of both experiments are similar. Partic-
ipants were better at remembering the exact words that were used,
indicating a more prominent surface representation, after direct
than after indirect speech. Bayesian analysis of the combined data
also showed strong evidence in favor of the alternative hypothesis,
BF01s=0.01.
General Discussion
Language can be viewed as a tool that ‘‘allows us to shape events
in each other’s brains with exquisite precision’’ [34]. Ultimately,
language comprehension amounts to creating a mental represen-
tation of the state of affairs described in an utterance. But how do
subtle differences in the form of an utterance have their effect on
how its contents are represented? In a series of experiments we
sought to answer this question for direct and indirect speech
quotations, which make up a major part of everyday communica-
tion. Our findings suggest that direct and indirect speech quotations
influence mental representations at different levels.
Although direct speech is perceived as more vivid and is thought
to be more engaging than indirect speech, we did not find support
for the idea that direct speech makes textual information regarding
the referential (Experiment 1) or the communicative situation
(Experiment 2) more accessible. In fact, we observed no effect of
speech in Experiment 1 and an advantage for indirect speech
Experiment 2. We were able to rule out that this latter finding was
due to greater task-switching costs after direct than after indirect
speech (Experiment 3).
At first, these results seem puzzling but they can be explained by
the distinction proposed by Clark and Gerrig [1]. According to
these authors, indirect speech quotations are a descriptive form of
language which means that they are aimed at conveying the gist of
an utterance without necessarily drawing attention to its specific
realization. Direct speech, on the other hand, is a depictive form of
language. It offers the listener a more direct perceptual experience
– comparable to looking at a Picasso painting itself, rather than
reading a description of that painting. We explored whether this
more direct perceptual experience – in this case of a person
speaking – involved a switch from the visual to the auditory
modality, as suggested by Yao and colleagues [3]. No evidence was
found in support of this idea (Experiment 4). A possible
explanation for this lack of support might be that the probe
recognition task differs from the methods that were used in
previous studies on direct and indirect speech and measured
sentence processing [3], [4], [5], [6]. However, the absence of a
priming effect of direct speech on auditory probes is consistent
with the results showing that for auditory priming effects to occur,
prior experience with a particular voice in the same context is
required [30]. In our experiment, participants did have prior
experience with the voices that pronounced the probe words but
not with the particular contexts in which they occurred. How is it
possible that people perceive direct speech as more vivid and
engaging than indirect speech, and yet we found no clue that it
makes the mental representation of the referential situation more
accessible, or the depicted speech act more perception-like?
Taking a cue from a well-known model of mental representations
[2], we hypothesized that direct and indirect speech influence
these representations at different levels (just as genre expectations
have been found to do [35]). We found support for this idea.
Participants showed superior memory for the exact wording of an
utterance when it had the form of a direct speech quotation as
compared to an indirect speech quotation (Experiment 5).
Apparently, direct speech makes the exact wording of an utterance
more salient, enhancing memory for the surface structure of the
utterance, whereas indirect speech leads comprehenders to focus
more on constructing a situation model.
To summarize, we have systematically addressed several
potential consequences of the use of direct versus indirect speech
quotations for comprehenders’ mental representations. As it
turned out, not all experiments showed an effect in the expected
direction or even an effect at all. Nevertheless, these results must
be considered informative. Given the large numbers of partici-
pants, our experiments had sufficient statistical power to detect
possible effects. Moreover, we used Bayesian analysis to determine
the posterior probability of the null hypothesis and the alternative
hypothesis for each experiment. This approach allows one to
combine the results of multiple experiments to compute a single
Bayes factor. By doing so with already large samples, we were able
to put confidence in our claims regarding the null hypotheses,
which would not be possible with the standard procedure of null
hypothesis significance testing alone.
Although some of our results seem to be at odds with earlier
findings in the literature, they need not be mutually exclusive. For
instance, while the effect of implied talking speed on actual reading
times may be a pervasive phenomenon, other aspects of the
communicative situation [5], [6], such as a talker’s voice or
manner of speaking, may only be simulated under specific
conditions.
Together, our experiments paint a slightly complex, but
coherent picture of the effect of direct and indirect speech
quotations on comprehenders’ mental representations. While
direct speech quotations make the exact wording of an utterance
more memorable, this does not necessarily hold for the informa-
tion it conveys.
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